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Abstract 
This paper assesses the attitude of investors towards Democratic change by performing an event 
study using Russian government bonds. The Revolution of 1905 offers an ideal occasion as, 
alongside the related revolutionary events, it was accompanied by two opposing constitutional 
changes within a short period of time. This study contributes to the debate as to whether 
Imperial Russia could possibly have followed other Western European states, i.e. gradually 
adopting a democratic rule, or whether a revolution was inevitable – as the writing of Soviet 
history suggests. Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War is taken into consideration. The results 
are basically in line with the literature on the impact of wars on capital markets. Prices of two 
types of bonds on both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock exchange are employed. As it 
turns out, investors in the East and West were largely consistent in their reactions. 
 
Keywords: Russian economic history; political stock market; Democratic change; impact war 
on stock markets
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The events of 1905 were a prologue to the two revolutions of 1917, that of February and that 
of October. In the prologue all the elements of the drama were included, but not carried through. 
(Trotsky 1932, p.12)  
 
 
Overview 
In modern Russian history a lot of attention has been given to the Bolshevik seizure of power 
in 1917, since Soviet Communism took a pivotal role in shaping the world’s history and politics 
in the 20th century. As shocking as it was for the elite throughout Europe, the Communist 
revolution did not come out of the blue. Years before the far-reaching events of February and 
October 1917, Russia’s political and economic situation at the beginning of the 20th century 
was far from stable. The looming defeat in a costly military engagement in the Far East against 
Japan and the deteriorating conditions of living had led to severe social unrest. The Revolution 
of 1905 – in many aspects a blueprint for the later courses of action – resulted in the adaption 
of large constitutional rights in the hitherto autocratically-ruled state. 
The sudden political change was a watershed for the country’s future political development. 
The participation of a much larger share of the population embodied a turn towards democracy. 
However, the granted reforms were revoked shortly afterwards and the old autocratic order was 
restored: Any expectation of fundamental political change turned out to be short-lived. Whether 
Russia could have gone the way of other western European states – gradually adopting 
constitutional democratic rights – or whether its inability inevitably lead to the Bolshevik 
Revolution has been disputed among historians ever since (Ascher 2004, xi).2  
This paper analyses how the various political events during the period of the revolution were 
perceived on the stock markets of Saint Petersburg and Berlin. An event study of the two most 
important types of Russian government bonds assesses the reaction of capital owners, which is 
particularly interesting in two aspects: 
                                                            
2 Soviet historians and socialist theorists like Leo Trotsky see the root of the revolution rather in the system itself 
(Frankel 2007, p.57) and the consequent uprising as therefore inevitable. The Tsar’s notion of the political 
development of his country was quite the opposite; He was optimistic in keeping the traditional way of 
authoritarian policies as they had been existent for centuries (Harcave 1964, p.18). For more recent historical 
evaluations see, for instance, Walkin (1964), Fröhlich (1981) or Bradley (2002).   
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First, it helps to reveal their view on the implementation of democratic institutions and rights. 
As these bring political and economic freedom and, as a consequence, stability, growth and 
prosperity,3 it should generally be welcomed by capital owners. They could, on the other hand, 
oppose any reforms of that kind since the outcome might be the redistribution of income, an 
increased provision of public goods and finally an increase in taxation. Also, foreign capital 
might be attracted by an authoritarian regime.4 As it turns out investors did not welcome the 
constitutional changes. At the same time, they did not realise the imminent threat of a 
revolution.5 Such a result implies that a gradual democratisation of Imperial Russia was seen 
as a realistic option in the long run – as opposed to the argument of Soviet historians. 
Second, both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock exchange are considered. This approach 
stresses the dissent between investors in the East and West regarding the appraisal of 
democratisation. Unlike Berlin, the efficiency of the Petersburg stock exchange has not been 
well-investigated.6 It was considerably smaller than other European markets at that time and 
traded less (Borodkin et al. 2006). However, the securities employed in this study developed 
almost equally at the two stock exchanges. The outcome of the event study suggests that 
investors’ behaviour did not differ substantially between Imperial Russia and the German 
Empire. 
Analogically, the economic effect of the military campaign in the Russo-Japanese war is 
established. The struggle for dominance in the Far East with Japan reached its peak directly 
before the revolution.7 Though it finally faced a disastrous and costly adventure, Russia aimed 
at the chance to expand influence in a strategically important region. In this context, Russia’s 
recent military involvements come to mind, which have had quite a measurable effect on an 
economic level: the Rouble has been depreciating massively, and net capital outflow has 
regained the high level of the economic crisis in 2008. This development is also reflected in the 
stock market development and, particularly, government bonds, which will be the basis of this 
analysis (Kholodilin et al. 2014). Empirical evidence on the extent to which capital market 
                                                            
3 In particular, the protection of property rights or the rule of law can facilitate investment and growth. 
4 Many studies find foreign direct investment to be fostered by authoritarian rule, especially in peripheral countries 
(Oneal 1994; Li & Resnick 2003; Mathur & Singh 2013). 
5 A possible threat of revolution is considered as another important driver of democratic transition in recent 
literature, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Morrison (2011), or Aidt and Franck (2015). 
6 At that time the Berlin stock exchange was already highly developed (see, for instance, Wetzel 1996, Gelman & 
Burhop 2008 or Lehmann 2014). 
7 In fact, the war worked as a catalyst for the revolutionary events in 1905 (Löwe 2007b). 
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prices are affected by military conflicts is ambiguous.8 This paper contributes to that literature 
by employing another conflict that has not yet been the object of such analysis: Only some of 
the war events that are considered historically important turn out to have impacted the stock 
market significantly. Furthermore, no home bias of Russian investors is detectable, since both 
markets reacted almost equally.  
In the following section the historical background is illustrated. Also, the events to be examined 
afterwards are delineated. Next, the data and the methodology are presented, which constitute 
– together with the related hypotheses – the general research approach. After the results have 
been outlined, the final section concludes. 
 
Economic and Political Backwardness 
The economic backwardness of Imperial Russia became evident to its rulers at the latest when 
it was defeated in the Crimean war. During the war the Russian superiority in manpower was, 
among other things, cancelled out by a lack of modern weapons and railroads. In the following 
decades modernisation efforts were undertaken – with initial success. Serfdom was abolished 
in 1861, the educational system and the military were modernised, economic and societal 
reforms were implemented9 – resulting in extremely high growth rates of GDP and industrial 
production during the 1890s. Regardless of the temporary economic advance Russia remained 
a largely autocratic state, unlike many other European states at that time. (Schmidt 2003 p.83ff.) 
Attempts to promote the self-government of rural municipalities were prevented by the interests 
of the aristocracy and central bureaucracy – and not at least by the Tsar himself (Löwe 2007 a, 
p.41ff.). Likewise, the peasants’ standard of living remained quite low. The areas of land that 
were allotted to them after the abolishment of serfdom were too undersized to guarantee a fair 
standard of living (Hoch 2004). Furthermore, even 40 years after the liberation of serfs, the 
redemption payment for former landlords still amounted to a large sum (Hoch 1994). In 
addition, most parts of the population, including an emergent middle class, were still excluded 
from political participation.  
                                                            
8 Often, impact of the well-regarded decisive events of a war are found to be strong (Frey and Kucher 2000; Brown 
and Burdekin 2002). Other authors, like Oosterlinck (2003) or Willard et al. (1996) do not find such a distinct 
pattern.  
9 Although not all of the ambitious reform plans could be implemented due to the varying interests. Former land 
owners, for instance, demanded financial compensation, which could not be given by the government as it was 
financially restrained itself. In fact, many former serfs remained as dependent as before (Hoch 1991). 
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After the turn of the century the high growth rates of industrial production could not keep pace 
with the population growth, as reflected in Table 1. In the absence of a prospering economy, 
and in light of a stagnating standard of living, structural problems came to light.10 
 
Table 1: Various growth rates in Imperial Russia  
Period Population Coal Oil Pig iron Grain 
1880–1885 11.4% 29.8% 411.4% 17.8% - 
1885–1890 8.3% 40.9% 105.6% 75.5% - 
1890–1895 5.2% 51.3% 66.9% 55.9% - 
1895–1900 7.3% 77.5% 67.4% 102.1% 10.0% 
1900–1905 8.3% 15.6% -27.8% -6.8% 1.2% 
Source: (Kahan 1989, p.69)     
 
In the wake of the Russo-Japanese war the economic situation further worsened. The 
deployment and support of troops in the Far East had a direct impact on the welfare of the 
Russian population, resulting in continuing upheaval. At the same time, the unsuccessful course 
of the war further reduced the government’s reputation. In the memories of Count Sergey Witte 
– a formative figure for Imperial Russian policy at the turn of the century11 – the war functioned 
as a catalyst: “It came the year 1905. The disturbance in the heads of all social classes grew and 
grew, related to our inglorious defeats in the Far East” (Witte 1923, p.197). 
The unrest culminated on 9 January 1905,12 when a large group of striking workers – estimated 
at 50,000 to 100,000 people – marched to the Winter Palace in order to express their discontent 
and hand over a petition for more democratic rights. Though initially peaceful, the mass was 
fired at by tsarist troops, resulting in hundreds of casualties. This so-called Bloody Sunday gave 
rise to large uprisings all over the country.13 These did not abate until the release of the October 
Manifesto on 30 October 1905. In this document the Tsar promised far-reaching constitutional 
                                                            
10 The dependency of autocratic regimes on economic prosperity appears to be a general phenomenon, as the recent 
discussions on the People’s Republic of China illustrate. As growth ceases, the demands for political change gain 
weight (see, for instance, The Economist 25 October 2014). 
11 Count Witte – serving among other things as Russian minister of finance – was largely responsible for fostering 
railway construction and industrialisation. Later, he became the main negotiator for peace with Japan and the 
author of the October Manifesto – as delineated below.  
12 That date corresponds to 22 January in the Julian calendar which had been still in use in Imperial Russia. All the 
dates mentioned hereafter refer to the Gregorian calendar. 
13 With its mainly agrarian-based economy, Russia was heavily affected by the uprisings in the countryside. For a 
more detailed study of the campaign there see Miller (2013). 
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rights, above all the introduction of a broad franchise for a newly established parliament – the 
Duma. It furthermore included extensive civil rights guaranteeing religious and political 
freedom as well as freedom of press (Dahlmann 2005, p.125ff.). Within a short period of time 
Russia’s political system was radically changed.  
The volatile political situation had still not been pacified. While the liberal movement saw its 
demands fulfilled, the socialist fraction of the formerly united opposition continued their 
protest. On 5 December 1905 a general strike paralysed economic and social life throughout 
Russia. Though the protest was finally brought to an end by force, it had a bearing on the 
political level: the exact shape of the new franchise was immediately announced by the 
government.14   
The year 1906 saw the actual implementation of the intended changes and extensions of 
political rights. Parties and other political organisations were founded in large numbers. On 23 
April the new constitution became law, followed by the solemn opening of the parliament on 
10 May (Dahlmann 2005, p.128ff.). 
 
Table 2: Overview political events 
Date Event 
22 January 1905 Bloody Sunday 
30 October 1905 October manifesto 
5 December 1905 General strike 
23 April 1906 Commencement of new constitution  
10 May 1906 Opening of the first Duma 
21 July 1906 Dissolution of the first Duma 
20 February 1907 Opening of the second Duma 
2 June 1907 Dissolution second Duma and new franchise 
All dates refer to the Gregorian calendar 
 
The eventual activity of the Duma did not match the high expectations of the new political era. 
In many important questions – for instance, the redemption payments for peasants, the dealing 
                                                            
14 The new suffrage widened the electorate to a great degree. Still, as a census suffrage, it strongly discriminated 
against the low income classes.   
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of private property and civil rights – the parliament and the government were heavily opposed. 
By 21 July of the same year, the Tsar made use of his constitutional right to dissolve the Duma.15   
Its successor – which started parliamentary activity in February 1907 – was not more convenient 
for the Tsar. The electorate did not welcome the sudden closing of the old Duma, which was 
accordingly a new composition of the old one. The members of parliament were even more 
leftist and radical, which made broad political consent impossible. The result was, once again, 
dissolution by the Tsar. This time, however, it was accompanied by a restriction of the 
franchise, which was a clear violation of the constitution. Extremely undemocratic in its nature, 
the newly decreed franchise was supposed to constitute a parliament voting in accordance with 
the government (Schmidt 2003, p.102ff.). The period of democratisation in Imperial Russia, 
initiated in 1905, did not even last for two years. 
 
The Struggle for Influence in the Far East 
Antecedent to the revolutionary campaign was a conflict with Japan for influence in the Far 
East, which had been intensifying since the turn of the century. The pursuing of long-term 
interests as well as short-term diplomatic miscalculation by the Russian government led to an 
eventual escalation of the conflict: The eastward expansion was part of Count Witte’s strategy 
to foster economic growth and open up new markets; a prominent symbol of that strategy was 
the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1904. It connected European Russia with 
Vladivostok at the Pacific Ocean and carried huge economic and military potential. In response 
to this threat, Japan demanded that Russia restrict its interests in the whole region,16 but the 
Russian government did little to comply. Russia completely ignored Japanese demands, not 
least due to the feeling of superiority over a non-European nation (Frankel 2007, p.54ff.).17  
As a result, Japan launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur. The Russian government was not 
paralysed for long, but was rather optimistic during the course of the war and hoped for the 
enthusiasm in large parts of the population which had been present in former military conflicts. 
                                                            
15 Though this is clearly showing the unwillingness of the Tsar to give up all of his political powers, the political 
factions did their bit, too. Most of them were newly founded and consequently the majority of the Duma was not 
well-organized and failed to find a consensus. A government responsible to or at least cooperating with the 
parliament could hardly emerge in that way, which furnished the Tsar with the means to dissolve the Duma (Galai 
2005). 
16 Since the Boxer-rebellion Russia had controlled Manchuria, while Japan had de facto annexed Korea in 1895 
(Connaughton 1988, p.3f.). 
17 For a comprehensive study of the origins of the war, see (Nish 1985). 
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That hope was in vain, as was the belief in the superiority of the Russian army. Alongside the 
war situation in the Far East theatre the troops’ morale worsened. At the same time, the 
population’s consensus of the war further decreased and the mobilisation of new troops became 
more and more difficult (Löwe 2007b, p.147ff.). 
 
Figure 1: Map of the war theatre  
 
Source: Connaughton 1988. 
 
 
In the following, the Russo-Japanese war is outlined. Table 3 lists the most decisive and 
significant events.18 As it turns out, in the majority of the battles the Imperial Russian army 
suffered defeats. In sharp contrast to the self-understanding of a traditional European power, 
                                                            
18 This section identifies the most decisive events of the war. If not marked differently, it is based on the work of 
Richard Connaughton (1988), who provides a detailed view of the war campaigns, and on the work of Ian Nish 
(2005). Bear in mind that only new information on the course of the war – decisive battles of strategic importance 
– are useful for an event study, which ascribes a change in prices to the altering expectations of investors.   
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the Japanese army was de-facto superior to the Russians in many aspects. Despite the recent 
completion of the Trans-Siberian Railways the logistical challenge of sending and maintaining 
troops so far from the mainland was formidable. Russia’s military – though large in numbers – 
consisted mainly of peasants whose motivation to fight a remote war against an unknown enemy 
was rather low. Japan on the other hand had put in great efforts to modernise its military. Based 
on the Prussian and British model – both leaders in their respective branch – Japan built highly 
trained and specialised forces, which could be employed directly from its doorstep in the 
Japanese Sea, Korea and Manchuria (Connaughton 1988, p.12ff.).  
 
Table 3: Overview of war events 
Date Event 
9 February 1904 First Japanese attack 
30 April 1904 Battle at Yalu River 
10 August 1904 Battle of the Yellow Sea 
2 January 1905 Capitulation of port Arthur 
10 March 1905 Mukden Battle 
27 May 1905 Battle of Tsushima 
27 June 1905 Mutiny on Battleship Potemkin 
5 September 1905  Treaty of Portsmouth 
All dates refer to the Gregorian calendar 
 
As the rivalry for influence in Korea and Manchuria peaked, the Japanese government 
demanded a declaration that recognised Korea as being out of the Russian sphere of interest.19 
In the absence of any response, Japan answered with a military launch. On 9 February 1904 the 
Japanese navy launched an attack on Port Arthur, damaging several Russian ships. No formal 
declaration of war preceded the attack, making it a particularly valuable event for study – 
notwithstanding the small strategic relevance. 
The first major confrontation on land was the Battle of Yalu River. On 30 April 1904 the 
Japanese army conquered all the Russian positions, though at a great cost of life. The Japanese 
fortunes of war continued at the Yellow sea, where Japan gained full control after the battle on 
10 August 1904.  
                                                            
19 In turn, Japan renounced any interest in Manchuria. 
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In the first half of the following year came the most decisive battle of the war. On 2 January 
1905 Port Arthur surrendered after a 154-day siege. Russia finally lost its strategically important 
sole naval base in the region and the remains of the Russian Far East fleet were destroyed. The 
impact on Russian public opinion and the troop’s morale was immense. Russia did not fare 
much better in the Battle of Mukden in March of the same year. Eventually, it was repulsed 
form Manchuria –though again the losses on the Japanese side were huge. The last critical naval 
battle was fought at the Tsushima strait. In a risky endeavour the Russian Baltic fleet had 
circumnavigated Africa, only to meet the same fate as its Far East counterpart. After this final 
trump card had failed to succeed, the defeat of Russia at all stages of the theatre was undeniable. 
Regardless of the course of the war so far, both sides showed a certain level of war weariness. 
The ongoing engagement was a financial and societal burden for Japan as well. When President 
Theodore Roosevelt of the United States offered to negotiate a peace treaty, the belligerents 
were keen to accept. In a long and tough conference, Japan could not take advantage of the fact 
that it had won nearly every battle. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on 5 September 1905, 
comprised the cession of Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and Kwantung. Apart from these minor 
territorial losses, the Russian delegation chaired by Count Witte was successful: Japanese 
demands for high reparation payments as well as more territorial claims were not fulfilled. 
Considering Russia’s performance on the battlefield, the peace treaty was to its best 
advantage.20  
 
Democratisation in Imperial Russia 
During the revolutionary period, Russia’s political system underwent considerable changes 
within a short period of time. Generally, a larger political participation of the masses can have 
numerous results, certainly altering the structure of politics as such. There is evidence that 
income is redistributed from the richer to the poorer parts of the population – now able to use 
its political power in order to enforce their claims (Husted and Kenny 1997; Justman and 
Gradstein 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Such a development is often accompanied by 
growing government expenditures (Aidt and Jensen 2009, p. 379) as well as an increase in the 
provision of public goods (Husted and Kenny 1997; Lott 1999; Aidt et al. 2006). In the end, 
                                                            
20 Correspondingly, the Japanese public perceived the outcome of the negotiations as extremely humiliating. In 
the following days, Tokyo was shaken by violent anti-peace riots (Westwood 1986, p.160ff). 
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these expenditures can be a burden for both the treasury and for firms.21 Authoritarian 
governments, by contrast, often claim to be a guarantor for political stability. Such a stable 
environment, combined with lower potential financial strains, is in the best interest of investors 
– visible, for instance, in the recent Turkish parliamentary elections in November 2015.22  
Despite the costs, the ruling elites extended the voting rights in most cases by choice. One main 
explanation is the importance of specific political constellations, in particular, political 
competition (Lizerri and Persico 2004; Turner and Zhan 2010). The other common argument is 
that the participation of a larger share of the population can avoid a threat of revolution, which 
can arise in the disenfranchised masses (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Morrison 2011; Aidt 
and Franck 2015).23 Such a stabilising element can counterweight the possibly negative 
outcome of an extension of democratic rights—the net effect is unclear.  
However, the existence of a “democratic advantage” for sovereign bonds issued by a 
corresponding regime is denied in recent literature (Saiegh 2005; Archer et al. 2007; Beaulieu 
et al. 2012). Turner and Zhan (2012) find a widening of the franchise in 1867 as disprized by 
investors at the London Stock exchange. In the Kingdom of Saxony the franchise was altered 
twice in close succession. Here, investors realised the negative effects of an enfranchisement of 
the lower and middle classes (Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 2014). Generally, investors seemed 
to be rather sceptical towards democracy. 
This study contributes by covering another market in a political environment that largely 
differed from other countries at that time. As the democratic reforms were revoked shortly after 
coming into effect in 1905, it exploited a virtual natural experiment. The general approach is 
comparable to that of the other historical studies in that context, namely to test the instant 
investor reaction by performing an event study. A negative reaction to an extension of 
democratic rights and vice versa supports an anti-democratic attitude of investors.24 Such results 
were found in Great Britain and partially in the Kingdom of Saxony. In these studies the main 
arguments were the potential costs arising from taxation and improved working conditions 
which might result from democratisation. This directly finds expression in the value of the 
                                                            
21 Which need to pay for the extra expenditures by higher taxation. A better protection of workers or related 
legislation can further increase the costs for firms.  
22 After the victory of conservative authoritarian government on 1 November 2015, the Turkish stock market and 
the currency increased significantly in value. (FAZ 2 November 2015) 
23 Democratisation can have many dimensions, not just in the extent of the franchise, but also in the power of the 
parliament as such. The interdependence between these two has to be taken into account before making 
generalisations (Pittaluga et al. 2015).  
24 Whether ideologically driven or just for profit maximization. 
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affected firms. In addition, Turner and Zhan (2012) try to check the threat of revolution 
hypothesis as claimed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Instead of firm stock prices this 
paper employs government bonds, which are advantageous for the following reasons: 
A revolutionary regime is likely to reject financial demands against its predecessor, whose 
expenditures are very likely considered to be illegitimate.25 Therefore, if the threat of revolution 
is taken seriously, government bonds are expected to benefit from a democratic reform. This 
would release some of the political pressure and accordingly increase the probability of the 
survival of the bond itself. Likewise, the revoking of reforms should have the reverse effect, 
since the risk of revolution is increased. While firms are likely to survive a system change, this 
does not hold for government bonds – issued by the old regime. Their prices consequently react 
more sensitively than firm stock prices, on which the previous studies are based. Theory and 
empirical findings imply a general anti-democratic sentiment of investors. A positive reaction 
of bond prices to the widening of democratic rights can be attributed to the expectation of a 
possible overthrow of the government. The same applies, of course vice versa, for the following 
dissolution of the Duma and the restriction of franchise. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A positive reaction of bond prices to an extension of democratic rights is due to 
a possible threat of revolution. 
 
The two events of unrest can be used to support this hypothesis, since they represent a direct 
threat of a revolution. If such a threat existed, the impact on prices should be negative.  
By quantifying the market reaction this study further allows a statement on how far the 
government’s decision to eventually leave the path of reform was backed by the elite. As 
elaborated above, bond prices reflect the possible risk of a revolution in the eyes of the 
investors. These embody the financial and societal elite not just of Russia, but of the whole of 
Europe.26 Decisions of one autocratic ruler – or at best of a small circle of people – might in the 
end be irrational. If on the other hand investment strategies follow a largely rational schedule, 
                                                            
25 Stephanie Collet (2013) gives an excellent example of sovereign bonds that are declared null in the wake of a 
regime change. She calls this type of debt “odious”, which underlines the immoral character of its usage. In fact, 
most of the government expenditures in Imperial Russia could be seen as somewhat oppressive since they were 
spent on the military and the repayment of older debts (Ischchanian 1913, p.210; Reichsbudget 1908). 
26 The structure of bond holders is depicted below. For a comprehensive view on foreign activity in Russian 
markets see, for instance, McKay (1970) or Ischchanian (1913). 
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the result reveals another view on the democratic prospects in Imperial Russia. It therefore 
contributes to the debate over how far indeed Imperial Russia was on a path towards a 
constitutional state. Could it possibly have remained a monarchy – and have followed the path 
of other western European states such as, for instance, Great Britain? This question has often 
been raised by historians, albeit without reaching a consensus (See, for instance, Walkin 1964, 
Fröhlich 1981 or Bradley 2002).27 This controversy about the Revolution of 1905 is by no 
means a modern one. Count Witte saw its cause in the Tsar’s political decisions and particularly 
in the war with Japan rather than in the system itself. In his eyes, the unrest resulted from the 
Tsars “…wavering and not from Russia’s desire for revolution” (Frankel 2007, p. 57). 
In sharp contrast, Soviet historians like Leo Trotsky detected immanent structural problems in 
the political system itself: “The monarchy loses its capacity for any kind of creative initiative; 
it defends itself, it strikes back, it retreats, its activities acquire the automatism of reflexes […] 
His nearest ancestors […] passed on to Nicholas a chaotic empire already carrying the matured 
revolution in its womb. If he had any choice left, it was only between different roads to ruin.”  
(Trotsky 1932, p.98). Unsurprisingly, he considered revolution to have originated in the system 
itself, and thus inevitable. The above hypothesis in a specific Russian context can thus be 
reformulated as follows: 
   
Hypothesis 2: If investors see a viable democratic prospect for Imperial Russia, bond prices 
are expected to react negatively to an extension of democratic rights. 
 
At first glance this seems contradictory. However, the argument is based on the assumption that 
not just the short-run valuation of democratic reforms is considered,28 but the risk of a 
revolution in the long run. Since a negative reaction to an extension of democratic rights would 
imply that only the unfavourable consequences of democracy play a role for the investors. In 
such a case they must estimate the chance of a revolution to be quite small. That in turn would 
express their confidence in the stability of a political system which has just begun to gradually 
change its foundations.29  
                                                            
27 In the same context, recent political developments in Russia have also been analysed (see Hahn 2004 or Hassner 
2008). 
28 Which should be – as far as the literature is considered – rather negative.  
29 Needless to say, such an assessment – from a present-day perspective – would have been a fatal misjudgement.  
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Moreover, a hugely popular historical narrative is re-examined. The mutiny on the battleship 
Potemkin has been a central motive in the history of revolution – not only in the Soviet Union. 
At a camp in nearby Odessa, abominable food rations and a very low morale led to increasing 
discontent among the sailors. Severe sanctions by the command eventually provoked a mutiny. 
Though the revolt failed to spread to other ships or cities, it remained hugely popular among 
the public.30 Nevertheless, the importance of the historical campaign remains questionable 
(Bennett 1959), which is why it is has been added to the event study. Thereby one can – en 
passant – probably substantiate the argument against the actual significance of that incident. 
 
 
War Effect on the Stock Market  
Generally, historical stock markets reflect political events in large measure. The majority of the 
literature focusses on elections (see, for instance, Bechtel 2009; Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 
chapters 3 and 4; Herron 2000; Leblang and Mukherjee 2004, 2005; Snowberg, Wolfers, and 
Zitzewitz 2006). Any altering of the political structure as, for instance, a change in franchise 
has been evaluated to lesser extent (Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 2014; Turner and Zhan 2012). 
Market reaction to wars and to related events has been discussed at length in the literature. Wars 
usually provide many instances which can be assessed by event studies. Since the outcome of 
single encounters is in general a surprise for the public, it is reasonable to make use of the 
immediate investors’ reactions – manifested in stock market prices. The empirical literature in 
this field focusses mainly on two conflicts: World War II and the American Civil War. In both 
cases, however, results are not totally unambiguous. Frey and Kucher (2000) find distinct 
effects using the sovereign bonds of different countries on the Swiss stock exchange.31 Brown 
and Burdekin (2002) employ a similar approach with prices on the London Stock Exchange. 
They focus on a particular German bond financing the reparation payments from World War I, 
which Hitler refused to pay back. Its price is found to move in the opposite direction to the 
progress of the German advances in Europe. 
Oosterlinck (2003) uses the information from the spread between Vichy state bonds – issued 
by the French regime collaborating with the German occupiers – and French Rentes, which 
stem from the third French republic. Changes in the spread are assumed to reflect the prospect 
                                                            
30 Its mainstream fame arose mainly from the Film by Sergey Einstein in 1925. There is a vast literature on the 
culture impact: for instance, Rosentreter (2011).  
31 An exception is the final capitulation of the Wehrmacht. It is argued that the German defeat – obviously 
unavoidable – had already been priced by market participants. 
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of the respective regime surviving the war.32 In Oosterlinck’s study investors react more 
sensitively to political rather than to military events. 
The second conflict that has been frequently investigated is the American Civil War. Related 
events also found their expression in financial market prices (McCandless 1996). However, the 
impact was not always in accordance with the historical assessment. Willard et al. (1996) fail 
to link all the battles that are generally considered important with significant structural breaks 
in the exchange rate of the greenback—a currency issued by the Union to overcome wartime 
financial restrictions. Based on the same approach, another study employs the prices of 
confederate cotton bonds traded in London and draws similar results (Brown and Burdekin 
2000). The historical assessment of the impact is apparently not always in line with the 
assessment of contemporary observers. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the literature, Russian bonds are expected to have been 
impacted by war events. First, Russia was already burdened by a huge debt prior to the start of 
the conflict with Japan. Also, its strategic position in the Far East was as disadvantageous as its 
fiscal condition. The huge cost of such a remote engagement as this eminently enhances the 
risk of failure. All the major battles in the war turned out to be disastrous for Russia, as 
previously described. This rare case allows us to formulate clear-cut expectations of the reaction 
of Russian bond prices, which are assumed to have been negative in general. An exception is 
the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which was quite advantageous for Russia and should, 
accordingly, have been perceived positively. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Russian government bonds reacted (negatively) to the war events of the Russo-
Japanese war. 
 
The Russo-Japanese conflict is particularly interesting for assessing how wars affect financial 
markets. It was not only of large political impact, but also sketched out modern warfare in great 
measure (Kowner 2007). Though geographically limited, it was widely recognised as modern 
communication swiftly spread the news all around the globe, which is another characteristic of 
most conflicts. Nevertheless, the war events have to be looked at with caution for two reasons. 
                                                            
32 In general, the two security types are nearly identical, except for the different issuing regime. Any spread 
therefore only reflects the risk of regime failure. 
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The first is the sheer size of the Russian Empire. News from a remote battlefield would probably 
have taken some time to reach the European part of Russia.33 Furthermore, the Russian press 
was characterised by purely patriotic rather than objective reporting and freedom of press was 
not yet in place (Grüner 2007). It remains questionable whether the severity of certain defeats 
of the Russian army was displayed in full.34 Since German newspapers were hardly suspicious 
of being pro-Russian, the comparison between price reactions at the Saint Petersburg and the 
Berlin stock exchange throws light on this issue. 
 
Investment in Russian Government Bonds  
Russian state borrowing has a long-reaching tradition and was crucial in the modern history of 
the country. As the state played a much larger role in the economic activity than elsewhere, it 
tried to offset its need for capital by extensively floating bond issues. As a consequence the 
government bond market preceded that of private securities and also remained greater in size 
until the end of the Empire (Papp 2001, p.32ff.). The price development of bonds is especially 
interesting to analyse, since these are assumed to react more sensitively than firm stock prices. 
The war was limited to a certain region and did not affect the economy on a total scale. In line 
with that the Rouble-Mark exchange rate remained relatively constant during the whole period 
– displayed in Figure 2. Therefore, a sensitive measure like government bond prices is well-
suited to establish any effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
33 Only one direct telegraph line to Russian mainland existed, alongside the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
34 Since the outcome of a battle probably leaked over a longer period, a sufficiently large event window becomes 
necessary. See the method section below. 
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Figure 2: Rouble-Mark exchange rate 
 
Source: Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta (Newspaper of Trade and Industry). 
 
Initially the financial resources raised by bond issuing were used mainly for warfare and 
military expenses, to a small extent also for railroad construction (Ukhov 2003, p.4ff.). In the 
late 19th century the main purpose was altered to support Russia’s industrialisation and its 
economic modernisation attempts. Both of these were largely organised and financed by the 
state. Moreover, compared to other European states, capitalism and a private financial system 
were far less developed, so that capital demand could hardly be satisfied on the domestic 
market. As a consequence, several new bonds were issued under Alexander III. Whereas 
hitherto the Russian government had used banks as an intermediator, it then began to issue 
directly to foreign markets of its own accord. Also, Gold bonds were introduced as a universal 
standard, as these could be traded more easily between different countries. Coupon and 
principal payments were either made in paper Roubles or in gold coins (Ukhov 2003, p.16ff.). 
While only slightly successful at the beginning, Russia gained large access to international 
financial markets after the turn of the century. Consequently, nearly half of all Russian 
government bonds were held by foreign investors in 1913 (Ukhov 2003, p.35).35 The German 
Empire played a vital role among the external capital sources, investing approximately 15% of 
                                                            
35 For all Russian companies, this share was 33.5% (Ukhov 2003, 35). 
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all German foreign capital in Russia (Nötzold 1975, p.241). Hence, the use of Berlin as a 
reference market is particularly suitable.36 
In the considered period government bonds accounted for a large share of the Russian capital 
market (Sidorov 1975, p.253). They were regarded as an attractive investment, not least due to 
the low level of trust in private enterprises and the dominant role of the state in business 
activities (Papp 2001, p.17f.). 
The stock exchange in Saint Petersburg has not been studied extensively in terms of efficiency. 
Though founded approximately at the same time as the city itself, it developed relatively late 
and first began to play a substantial role for the Russian economy in the late 19th century 
(Borodkin et al. 2006, p.4f.). That development took place despite an unfavourable economic 
environment. The Russian industry was homogeneous in structure and based on only a few 
sectors. Also, a legislation which impeded the creation of firms inhibited a prosperous economic 
development in general (Owen 1995, p.16ff.). In addition, the establishment of the so-called 
security department at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange in 1900 is usually seen as hindering 
the development of a free market, since it imposed strict controls on trading (Papp 2001, p.8). 
On the other hand, the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange did indeed react to external events and, 
what is more, to political ones (Borodkin et al. 2006).37 Particularly after 1900 it appeared to 
be, in many aspects, a largely developed market (Papp 2001, p. 324f.). 
The Berlin Stock Exchange is a clearer case. It performed well even when measured against 
modern standards. Berlin displayed a high level of information efficiency (Gelman and Burhop 
2008), low trading costs (Gehrig and Fohlin 2006) and low costs of IPOs, indicating its 
efficiency in underwriting new issues (Lehmann 2014). Furthermore, it was well integrated 
with other European markets, since the prices of internationally traded securities developed 
almost equally (Baltzer 2006). All in all, Berlin seems to be an appropriate benchmark market 
for assessing the performance of the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. 
As it turns out prices at Berlin and Saint Petersburg moved largely in an equal way and – 
demonstrated in the data section – both bond price series are integrated. The difference in 
investors’ reaction to specific events can thus expose the varying attitudes: the validity of the 
                                                            
36 Several Russian governments bonds as well as railroad companies were traded in Berlin. They were listed in the 
official stock list or in the stock almanac Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1914). France and 
Belgium were also of great importance for Russian firms and bonds.  
37 According to Borodkin et al. (2006), these political events mattered a lot more for prices than the fundamental 
values of a security. 
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above formulated hypotheses might very well differ between the two markets due to the societal 
and political background. This applies to political events as well as war events, where a 
nationalist view could create some sort of home bias for Russian government bonds. A more 
anti-democratic attitude of the Russian elite would also condense in the returns during political 
events.38 Admittedly these interpretations remain speculative: lack of efficiency cannot be 
completely ruled out—a different structure of investors could cause such an effect as well. 
Particularly in the case of war events, the available information might be another source of 
bias.39 Nevertheless, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Possible differences in bond returns at the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock 
exchanges are due to differences in investors’ attitude. Hypotheses 1 and 2 might not be 
answered consistently in this case.  
 
 
Method 
The impact at the stock exchange are analysed by applying standard event study methodology 
on Russian government bonds.40 Figure 2 visualises the approach. In an estimation period        [T-
1, T1], which is unaffected by the event – the estimation window – the parameters later used to 
determine the expected (normal) returns are calculated. The event under consideration occurs 
at T0 and can in theory affect the stock market during the event window [T1, T2], which can lie 
on either side of T0. This is due to the fact that information might leak before the actual event, 
which is typically relevant for earnings announcement or the like. There is no general consensus 
on the exact length of the estimation period. Usually, it is set between one and six months for 
daily prices.41 As prices in the considered period are overall unstable, a relatively short 
estimation window of 60 days is used in this study. 
                                                            
38 Historical research often claims a pervasion of the whole Russian society by autocratic attitudes and ideals (see 
Bradley 2002). 
39 This could be due to probably favourable war reporting in Russian newspapers, as described above. Information 
on political events should have been accessible even more easily for Russian investors, as they were located 
nearby: the Winter Palace, for instance, where the event on bloody Sunday took place, is well within sight of the 
Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. 
40 For an overview of this method see MacKinlay (1997). 
41 For an overview see, for instance, Bessembinder et al. (2009). 
20 
 
Figure 3: Estimation and event window 
 
         (estimation window)              (event window) 
          T-1        T1                  T0                      T2 
Source: MacKinlay (1997). 
 
 
The central element of this method is the estimation of the expected return. Subtracted from the 
actual return, the resulting abnormal returns reflect the impact of the event itself. Here, the 
constant mean return model is employed. Based on the period-t returns of security i, the model 
is as follows: 
itiitRE  )(   With   0itE   and   2titVar                (1) 
Though much simpler than the often used market model, this approach yields results which are 
similar and as equally powerful as more sophisticated ones (Brown and Warner, 1980; 1985). 
The expected return is simply the mean return of the previous period. Afterwards, abnormal 
returns in the event window are established. Specifically, these are calculated for security i at 
time t as: ARit = Rit −E(Rit), where Rit is a stock’s realized return for time t and where E(Rit) is 
its expected return in the absence of the event, as calculated above. Then the average cumulated 
abnormal return (ACAR) from t=T1 to t=T2  is 

 

N
i
T
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itARN
ACAR
1
2
1
1   (2), 
where N is the number of securities in the sample during each event. To test the significance of 
the ACARs, their variance is estimated by using cross-sectional variance across the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the various bonds. This cross-sectional approach takes account of an 
increase in event period variance (Campbell et al. 1997, p.168; Turner and Zhan 2012, p.620). 
Using the cross-sectional approach to form an estimator of the variance gives:  
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The test statistic is then calculated as: )(ACARVar
ACARt  , which is asymptotically standard 
normal.  
 
Data 
For this study the daily prices of specific Russian government bonds were hand-collected from 
two major sources. The Saint Petersburg prices stem from the daily newspaper Torgovo-
Promyshlennaya Gazeta,42 whereas Berlin price sheets can be found in Berliner Börsenzeitung, 
which – just like the Gazeta – includes the daily official price sheet of the stock exchange.43 At 
both markets, prices were listed as a percentage of the nominal value, which is denominated in 
Roubles. The event dates were re-checked in the daily newspapers Frankfurter Zeitung and 
Berliner Börsenzeitung.44 
Though various municipal bonds were issued in Russia, most were traded only sporadically and 
were rather seen as a long-term investment for institutional investors (Papp 2001, p.39). 
Consequently, only central governments are qualified for this analysis. Still, the low frequency 
of trading remains a major drawback for the data quality. Finally, only those types of securities 
which were traded on a regular basis on both markets enter the analysis: The 4% State Bond – 
following the Russian notation also referred to as Renta – and the 31/8% Convertible 
Obligation.45 For both of these securities, there was at best one week without a price notation. 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 Торгово- промышленная газета, the literal translation is Commerce and Industry Newspaper. Further, missing 
prices were counterchecked in Birzeveye Vedomosti (Stock Exchange Gazette).  
43 Available at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. Also online: 
 http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/2436020X/ (07.12.2015) 
44 For most events, the news were announced on the event day itself, in some cases a few days delayed. Still, a 
large event window should capture the possible effect. In addition, a detailed review of Russian newspapers would 
be preferable. This task unfortunately was beyond the author’s tight time schedule and poor language skills.  
45 Государственная рента and конвертируемая облигация respectively. 
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Figure 4: State bonds 
 
The solid line displays the development of prices at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. The dashed line reflects 
the Berlin stock exchange. 
 
Figure 5: Convertible obligations 
 
The solid line displays the development of prices at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. The dashed line reflects 
the Berlin stock exchange. 
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Figures 4 and 5 show the two different types of bonds used in this study. In both graphs the 
solid line shows the prices on the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, whereas the dashed line 
represents Berlin. An overall downward trend in the development of bond prices is apparent. 
However, there is large variation in prices, especially at the time of the revolutionary events. 
To link these with the occurring changes in prices, the central idea of the technique is applied 
here.  
 
 
Figure 6: Difference in prices of State Bonds 
 
The graph shows the difference in prices of 4% State Bonds between the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange and the 
Berlin stock exchange. 
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Figure 7: Difference in prices of Convertible Obligations 
 
The graph shows the difference in prices of 3 1/8% Convertible Obligations between the Saint Petersburg Stock 
Exchange and the Berlin stock exchange. 
 
Interesting, especially for comparing the efficiency of both markets, is the spread between the 
two markets, which is shown in figures 6 and 7 respectively. There seems to be no irregular 
pattern, except probably in 1906, when the variance of state bond prices appears to be somewhat 
greater. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test, however, shows that the two differences of the series 
are stationary. Moreover, applying the Engle-Granger two-step method reveals that price series 
of both Renta and Obligations are integrated with its counterpart at the other market.46 Table 4 
displays the corresponding descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
46 In fact, the two tests are to a large extent equivalent. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Renta, Obligations and the differences 
  Renta Petersburg 
Renta 
Berlin 
Spread 
Renta 
Obligations 
Petersburg 
Obligations 
Berlin 
Spread 
Obligations
Mean 83.17 82.81 0.37 80.37 79.71 0.58 
Median 84.13 84.10 0.28 81.75 81.20 0.65 
Std. Dev. 10.03 10.11 0.83 9.87 9.85 0.95 
Minimum 69.0 65.8 -3.5 63.0 64.0 -5.8 
Maximum 99.5 99.8 6.1 96.9 99.5 3.5 
Skewness 0.15 0.15 1.86 0.17 0.14 -0.59 
Kurtosis 1.61 1.59 11.97 1.65 1.66 5.83 
Source: Own calculation. 
For both security types, mean as well as median prices are slightly higher in Saint Petersburg. 
There is some variation in both spread series, though. Also, the spread of the Convertible 
Obligations possesses a negative skew in contrast to the difference in Renta prices, 
correspondingly the Minimum and Maximum values appear.47  
 
Results 
Tables 5 and 6 show the event study results for Saint Petersburg and Berlin respectively. In 
contrast to the descriptive statistics and the integration test results, the two markets do not 
always behave consistently. In nearly all cases, however, the size and the sign of the abnormal 
return is the same, only the corresponding p-values differ. Considering only the war events, this 
difference is negligible, too. Generally speaking, the Berlin stock market and the investors there 
seemed to react slightly more sensitively to political events and adjusted their portfolio 
accordingly. As stated in the previous chapter, one reason for this may be the differing 
availability of information. Reporting in Russian newspapers was more favourable towards the 
Tsarist government than elsewhere, especially in times of war.48 A free press had not yet been 
established and, particularly in the Russo-Japanese war, the press organs of all political colours 
wrote patriotically and emphasized Russian superiority over the Japanese race and culture. 
Likewise, the war reporting was one-sided and naively ignored the strength of the Japanese 
military (Grüner 2007, p.188ff.). This is not in line with the results presented in Table 5 as the 
                                                            
47 Though likely to occur in this case, it is not necessarily the consequence of the sign of the skewness. Also, a 
positive versus a negative skewness is not necessarily reflected in the relation of Mean to Median, as in this case.  
48 To figure out how far newspaper coverage diverged in different countries would surely help to identify early 
market integration in general. As this requires intensive historical research, it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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supposed differences in reporting did not find expression in different price reactions. The 
assessment of the war events was to a large extent equal in Berlin and Saint Petersburg. 
Probably, the Russian press at that time did report more freely than is assumed in literature.  
Following Hypothesis 4, there was no significant difference in attitude between investors in the 
East and West. In a way, investment during the early 20th century was already globalised. 
Accordingly, the spread between the two markets is small for both bond types. There was no 
home bias of Russian investors and even in war times patriotic feeling was less important than 
the pursuit of profit. The involved persons or institutions might actually have been the same at 
both markets, causing a similar result. There is evidence of the importance of the role of foreign 
investors at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the exact ownership is difficult to determine, 
however (Papp 2001, p. 433ff.).49 
                                                            
49 The majority of shares were bearer and not name shares. Furthermore, many Russian capital owners deposited 
their shares abroad, which skews even the broad statistic of origin of capital.  
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Table 5: Results of the event study for war events 
Date Event (-3; +3) (-7; +7) (0; +7) (-7; 0) 
Petersburg  ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
9 Feb 04 First Japanese attack -0.0358 0.010 -0.0438 0.007 -0.0183 0.038 -0.0137 0.064 
30 Apr 04 Battle of Yalu River -0.0042 0.364 -0.0165 0.046 -0.0172 0.042 0.0006 0.880 
10 Aug 04 Battle of the Yellow Sea  -0.0011 0.788 -0.0029 0.508 -0.0013 0.748 -0.0013 0.748 
2 Jan 05 Capitulation of Port Arthur -0.0151 0.054 -0.0167 0.044 -0.0025 0.557 -0.0017 0.692 
10 Mar 05 Mukden Battle -0.0025 0.559 -0.0107 0.098 -0.0079 0.162 -0.0034 0.455 
27 May 05 Battle of Tsushima 0.0029 0.509 0.0050 0.306 0.0021 0.622 0.0021 0.616 
27 Jun 05 Mutiny on Potemkin -0.0028 0.528 -0.0091 0.130 -0.0013 0.757 -0.0056 0.261 
5 Sep 05 Treaty of Portsmouth 0.0150 0.054 0.0543 0.004 0.0038 0.402 0.0475 0.006 
Berlin       
9 Feb 04 First Japanese attack -0.0480 0.009 -0.0616 0.006 -0.0099 0.169 -0.0255 0.032 
30 Apr 04 Battle of Yalu River -0.0127 0.114 -0.0326 0.020 -0.0343 0.018 -0.0008 0.887 
10 Aug 04 Battle of the Yellow Sea  -0.0013 0.813 -0.0064 0.304 0.0037 0.517 -0.0112 0.140 
2 Jan 05 Capitulation of Port Arthur -0.0143 0.093 -0.0186 0.058 -0.0136 0.101 -0.0010 0.846 
10 Mar 05 Mukden Battle -0.0070 0.273 -0.0134 0.103 -0.0093 0.186 -0.0025 0.645 
27 May 05 Battle of Tsushima -0.0005 0.926 0.0068 0.286 0.0019 0.727 0.0043 0.459 
27 Jun 05 Mutiny on Potemkin -0.0035 0.530 -0.0229 0.039 -0.0121 0.123 -0.0105 0.153 
5 Sep 05 Treaty of Portsmouth 0.0196 0.052 0.0498 0.009 -0.0111 0.141 0.0597 0.006 
The upper part of the table shows the results at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the lower part refers to Berlin. Bolded ACAR-values are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: Results of the event study for political events 
Date Event (-3; +3) (-7; +7) (0; +7) (-7; 0) 
Petersburg  ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
22 Jan 05 Bloody Sunday 0.0021 0.616 -0.0088 0.137 -0.0024 0.584 -0.0069 0.200 
30 Oct 05 October manifesto -0.0035 0.442 -0.0219 0.027 -0.0121 0.080 -0.0091 0.130 
5 Dec 05 General strike -0.0053 0.283 -0.0688 0.003 -0.0081 0.155 -0.0583 0.004 
23 Apr 06 First constitution  0.0032 0.478 -0.0021 0.627 0.0051 0.295 -0.0112 0.092 
10 May 06 Opening first Duma 0.0078 0.167 0.0018 0.672 0.0063 0.224 -0.0056 0.263 
21 Jul 06 Dissolution first Duma 0.0160 0.048 0.0398 0.008 -0.0010 0.811 0.0404 0.008 
20 Feb 07 Opening Second Duma -0.0045 0.340 -0.0040 0.384 -0.0020 0.639 -0.0020 0.640 
2 Jun 07 Dissolution second Duma -0.0004 0.924 -0.0026 0.550 -0.0001 0.975 -0.0019 0.660 
Berlin     
22 Jan 05 Bloody Sunday -0.0245 0.035 -0.0086 0.207 0.0010 0.847 -0.0095 0.181 
30 Oct 05 October manifesto -0.0012 0.829 -0.0419 0.012 -0.0129 0.111 -0.0489 0.009 
5 Dec 05 General strike -0.0371 0.016 -0.0740 0.004 -0.0024 0.663 -0.1034 0.002 
23 Apr 06 First constitution  -0.0126 0.115 -0.0059 0.337 0.0113 0.137 -0.0132 0.106 
10 May 06 Opening first Duma -0.0055 0.365 -0.0179 0.062 -0.0092 0.189 -0.0099 0.169 
21 Jul 06 Dissolution first Duma 0.0184 0.059 0.0278 0.027 0.0116 0.131 0.0149 0.086 
20 Feb 07 Opening Second Duma -0.0163 0.074 -0.0160 0.076 -0.0063 0.309 -0.0077 0.243 
2 Jun 07 Dissolution second Duma -0.0033 0.550 -0.0084 0.217 -0.0137 0.100 0.0032 0.568 
The upper part of the table shows the results at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the lower part refers to Berlin. Bolded ACAR-values are significant at the 10% level. 
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In all the event window specifications used, the symmetric two-week window produces the 
most significant abnormal returns. Obviously the effect needed some time to establish. In Table 
6 the outcome appears to have been anticipated in advance and already priced in, as the effect 
took place the week before. This seems plausible for political, but not for war events. Here the 
outcome (of a battle) is rather stochastic for uninvolved persons such as investors. Exceptions 
are the outbreak of the war and the signing of the peace treaty, both of which were foreseeable.50 
Indeed, as Table 5 shows, only in these (quasi-political) cases does the pre-event window 
produce significant abnormal returns.  
Where significant, the war events did play a role for investors in the supposed direction. While 
defeats were perceived negatively, the treaty of Portsmouth was welcomed in both Saint 
Petersburg and Berlin – in line with the common historical assessment, which considers the 
treaty as very favourable for the Russian Empire. Hypothesis 3 can be largely confirmed, 
substantiating previous research on the impact of wars on financial markets. Since not every 
battle that has been assessed as historically important resulted in a significant stock market 
reaction, this result is mostly consistent with the findings of Willard et al. (1996) and 
Oosterlinck (2003). 
Not significant at all is the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin. It won its fame not until later 
years, according to historical research mostly due to Soviet propaganda and the well-known 
movie by Sergey Eisenstein. 
As mentioned before, and as is visible in Table 6, for political events the Berlin stock exchange 
played the much bigger role. The two cases of large public unrest – Bloody Sunday and the 
general strike in December 1905 – are accompanied by a negative price reaction. The former, 
though, is well-recognised in public, though to a smaller extent. The harmful consequences of 
the general strike for the whole economy obviously weighted heavier for investors than just a 
political uprising as such – no matter how violent. In the investors’ view a revolution was not 
imminent as they rather feared the costly consequences of a standstill of the economy. 
Altogether, this is a first indication of the validity of the first hypothesis.  
When the October manifesto was released in 1905, the response on the stock market was only 
small in magnitude. The sole announcement of reforms was probably neither credible nor 
                                                            
50 While the former was a result of growing tensions, which have been widely reported. The course of the peace 
negotiations was also published in the press. The Russian delegation, in particular, had close relations to journalists 
and even used them to influence the (American) public (Westwood 1986, p.158). 
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already expected by the public: After all, the continuing upheaval most obviously required at 
least some release of political pressure. The other political events follow a consistent pattern 
with respect to hypotheses 1 and 2. Except for the new constitution coming into effect all the 
events that imply a shift towards more democracy induced negative abnormal returns. By 
contrast, when the newly established parliament was dissolved in July 1906, the reaction of 
investors was quite positive. The first attempt to implement parliamentarism was defeated after 
only a short period, though, as it turns out, in the best interest of capital owners. When the 
parliament was dissolved for the second time a year later, no significant abnormal price 
movement materialised. Just as before, the Duma had failed to cooperate with the government 
successfully. As Count Witte noted: “The dissension between the activity of the government 
and the activity of the Duma was obviously and permanently revealed. It was clear that it cannot 
go on like that” (Witte 1923, p.519). The public and investors most likely did anticipate the 
very same response by the Tsar as beforehand: once more, the parliament was dissolved. 
Accordingly, no abnormal price behaviour manifested itself when the decision was finally 
announced. 
Considering the overall market reaction, the first two hypotheses can mostly be confirmed. 
Investors at both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock exchange did not welcome 
democratic change. Despite – partially violent – uprisings they saw no threat of revolution that 
could enhance the risk of the failure of government bonds; In line with recent literature, this 
study fails to find a “democratic advantage” of Russian government bonds. Following 
hypothesis 2, this in turn implies that capital owners saw the chance that Russia would gradually 
develop towards a more democratic state in the long run. As explained above, this is inferred 
from an initial anti-democratic attitude. The positive perception of events related to 
democratisation in the short run requires the expectation of a stable, non-revolutionary 
development in the long run. Gradual parliamentarisation – which had happened recently in 
most western European states – must have been considered to be a quite realistic option for the 
Russian Empire. 
 
Conclusion 
Political as well as war events related to the Revolution of 1905 and the Russo-Japanese war 
mattered for investors throughout Europe. By using event study technique, this paper reveals 
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that the prices of Russian government bonds at both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock 
exchange reacted sensitively and pretty much in an equal manner. 
The reaction to political events implies a general anti-democratic attitude of investors. 
Likewise, a possible threat of revolution is not reflected in the price development. Synonymous 
with this result, a gradual democratic development in the long run appeared realistic for 
contemporary capital owners – notwithstanding the fact that the 1905 Revolution effectively 
served as a blueprint for the Bolshevik revolution a decade later. 
Similar to nowadays, the involvement in military conflicts repelled investors, especially when 
the chances for victory were uncertain. Furthermore, this paper substantiates the findings of 
other authors on the importance of war events: Not all dates that have been considered as greatly 
important – like the October manifesto or the battle of Tsushima – were in retrospect recognised 
as such in the capital market. 
Finally, both markets reacted largely in an equal way, particularly to war events. There was no 
home bias of Russian investors during war times. Moreover, bond prices do not reflect a 
significant difference in investors’ attitude towards democratisation in the East and West. In 
this respect a globalised political stock market was well in place in ‘backward’ Imperial Russia 
in the early 20th century.  
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MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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